Terrorism: Chemical Weapons

Introduction to Leader's Guide
by Shirley Ayers

The specter of terrorism looms ever larger in our world. Terrorists may be state sponsored, or, more commonly, exist as small unsponsored groups with special interests or agendas. Emergency personnel who once concerned themselves with responding to fires, natural disasters and industrial accidents now must also train to respond to attacks of terrorism. Although many federal agencies are on call to respond to incidents of terrorism, it is the local emergency responder who will shoulder the burden during the critical first hours after an attack.

Acts of terrorism are particularly insidious because their unpredictability and apparent randomness create fear. The damage to persons and property may exceed the experience and capabilities of medical personnel and response organizations.

The violence of terrorism is intended to have an emotional impact on civilians, producing effects far beyond the immediate physical damage. Also terrorists tend to have a very high degree of dedication to their plan. According to Gary Briese, Executive Director of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, "Once a terrorist incident is underway, the success rate is nearly 75%. If suicide is part of the terrorist's plan, the success rate rises to over 95%."

Emergency responders wage an uphill battle in their fight against terrorism. Terrorist groups often have financial backing, so money usually isn't a problem for them. With the rapid advance of technology, the technical skills and sophistication of terrorists is also escalating. Although many of the response protocols may appear similar to other hazardous materials responses, terrorist organizations will not comply with hazardous materials regulations and standards, so responders won't have the benefit of MSDS, UN numbers or placards to offer clues about the agent used. Weapons may not be readily identifiable, and secondary devices may be present 50% of the time in terrorist attacks.

Adding to the pressure on emergency responders is the fact that the public has now come to expect extraordinary rescue efforts, on the scale of the Oklahoma City federal building bombing rescue.

Terrorist weapons
Terrorism may take many forms. A terrorist act may be categorized by the weapon involved. The term 'weapons of mass destruction' implies the damage terrorists can do. In general, terrorist weapons of mass destruction fall into four categories:

Explosives
Chemical agents
Biological agents
Radioactive materials

This Leader's Guide accompanies Emergency Film Group's program "Terrorism: Chemical Weapons," a training video that deals with terrorist incidents involving chemical agents. "Terrorism: Chemical Weapons" is part of the Terrorism Response series. Other programs in this series include "Terrorism: 1st Response,"which deals with the actions of first arriving units; and "Terrorism: Biological Weapons," which covers response to incidents involving biological agents.
Chemical weapons were originally designed for use on the military battlefield to injure, incapacitate or kill the enemy. In World War I, the use of chemical agents began with the use of irritants known today as incapacitating agents and escalated by the end of that war to the use of blister and choking agents, which caused great suffering and death. The devastation caused by these weapons proved so repugnant that many countries agreed to forbid their use and manufacture.

Nevertheless, chemicals and chemical agents proliferated. Some chemical agents of today are hundreds of times more potent than those used in World War I. Although not used on the battlefield during World War II, chemical agents were used to kill millions of civilians in places like Auschweitz and Buchenwald.

Chemical weapons reappeared on the military battlefield in the 1980's when it was confirmed that mustard and the nerve agent Tabun (GA) were used by Iraq against Iran. Then, in 1995, the unthinkable happened, when the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo released the chemical agent Sarin (GB) in the Tokyo subway, killing 13 people and injuring more than 5,000. This attack was the culmination of a series of eight attacks the terrorist group had executed in a 20-month period.

Federal intelligence agencies estimate that more than two dozen countries are stockpiling chemical agents. The subway attack and the rise of high profile radical groups bring rising concern about the widespread availability of chemical materials, and about the potential of deliberate chemical attacks occurring in any town.

Chemical agents A chemical agent may be defined as a compound which, through its chemical properties, produces lethal or damaging effects in humans, animals, plants or materials. Unlike biological agents, chemical agents are usually man-made through the use of industrial chemical processes.

Chemical agents are classified by their effects:

Lethal agents -- includes both nerve agents and blood agents
Blister agents -- also known as vesicants
Choking agents -- also known as pulmonary agents
Incapacitating agents -- sometimes called riot control agents
Lethal agents are designed to kill, and are broken down into two subcategories: nerve agents and blood agents. Nerve agents, the most deadly of all chemical agents, disrupt the way nerves communicate with the organs and are quickly fatal in cases of severe exposure. Blood agents (sometimes called cyanides) interfere with the blood's ability to carry oxygen throughout the body.
Blister agents, or vesicants, cause a blistering of the skin and mucous membranes, especially the lungs.
Choking agents, or pulmonary agents, irritate the lungs, causing them to fill with fluid.
Incapacitating agents, cause an intense (but temporary) irritation of eyes and respiratory tract.

For an in-depth examination of each of these classes of agents, including symptoms of exposure, detection methods and decontamination, see Appendix A.

Chemical agents like all other substances may exist as solids, liquids or gases, depending on temperature and pressure. Except for riot-control agents, which are almost always solids, chemical agents in weapons are liquids. Following detonation of the weapon, the agent is dispersed as a liquid or an aerosol.

The potential of the agent to do damage is measured by how readily it disperses. Chemical agents are either persistent or non-persistent. Persistent agents have low volatility, evaporate slowly and are particularly hazardous in liquid form, though not particularly hazardous in vapor form. They stay around for long periods of time (24 hours or longer) and contaminate not only the air but objects and terrain as well. Persistent agents are used by the military to deny the use of the terrain and equipment. Mustard and the nerve agent VX are examples of persistent agents.

Non-persistent chemical agents are volatile and evaporate quickly, within several hours. Gases, aerosols, and highly volatile liquids tend to disperse rapidly after release. Phosgene, cyanide and the G series of nerve agents are non-persistent agents. Because of their volatility, they pose an immediate respiratory hazard but are not particularly hazardous in liquid form.

Wind and rain will increase the dispersion rate of a chemical agent. Heavy rains act to dilute both persistent and non-persistent agents and facilitate penetration into the ground.

Specialized terms refer to the amount of chemical agent encountered during an exposure:

ED50 denotes the quantity of liquid agent that will predictably cause effects in 50% of a given group;
ID50 denotes the quantity of liquid agent that will predictably cause incapacitation in 50% of a given group;
LD50 denotes the lethal dose or quantity by weight of liquid agent that will be lethal to 50% of a given group;
LCt50 denotes the lethal amount of inhaled vapors that will be lethal to 50% of a given group.

First responder issues
Pre-incident planning for a terrorist event requires the identification of areas within each jurisdiction that may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Although it is important to profile locations that are likely to be targeted by terrorists, it is important to remember that the proximity of a potential target is not the only threat. Chemical agents pose a threat during every phase of their existence: production, packaging, storage and delivery to the intended target. All of those locations and the places in between are at risk.

Many common hazardous materials used in industry pose the same threat to emergency responders as the chemicals classified as nerve, blister, blood and choking agents. A terrorist can inflict equivalent damage just as effectively with an industrial agent, hazardous material or a military agent.

For example:

Common Chemical:	Effect
Organophosphate insecticide	nerve agent
Dimethyl sulfate	blister agent
Methyl isocyanate	blood agent
Anhydrous ammonia	choking agent

In profiling a community and planning a defense, all of the following (or similar) scenarios should be considered:

A hazardous chemical production or storage facility is sabotaged
A tractor/trailer or railroad tanker containing hazardous materials is deliberately breached in a populated area
A radical group is discovered to be in possession of a chemical weapon
A chemical agent is released upon the civilian population

Signs and symptoms of attack
Chemical agents do not need to be lethal to be disruptive. Unlike an attack with explosives, the fact that a terrorist has attacked with a chemical agent may not always be obvious at first. Many of the early signs and symptoms produced by chemical warfare agents may resemble those of a variety of disorders, including stress. Other symptoms include psychological withdrawal, palpitations, gastrointestinal distress, headaches, dizziness, and inattentiveness. It may be the medical community that first recognizes that a chemical agent has been released.

The patient's clinical presentation will offer clues about the type of toxic substance used. Victims exposed to a high concentration of nerve agents will be down with no obvious signs of trauma. On the other hand, victims exposed to blister agents may show no symptoms for up to 48 hours. More specific information on symptoms is covered in Appendix A.

Responders should be alert for the following signs that a chemical agent may have been dispersed:

Explosions that dispense liquids, mists or gas
Explosions that seem only to destroy a package or bomb device
Unscheduled and unusual spray being disseminated
Abandoned spray devices
Numerous dead animals, fish and birds
Lack of insect life
Mass casualties without obvious trauma
Definite pattern of casualties and common symptoms
Civilian panic in potential target areas (government buildings, public assemblies, subways, etc.)

Responding to the scene
If a chemical attack is suspected, first responding units must approach with caution. A responder who becomes a victim becomes more of a drain on available resources. They must be wary of contaminated terrain and contaminated objects. Hazmat response protocols must be initiated, as well as incident command.

Victims and potential victims must be evacuated rapidly from the contaminated area and decontaminated as quickly as possible. Control zones must be set up and the perimeter (at least 100 ft.) secured. Responders must be on the alert for secondary devices, and must preserve the scene for evidence.

Calls for help should include the FBI and other appropriate state and federal agencies, as well as local hazmat teams, bomb squads, hospitals, EMS, and other emergency personnel, all of whom must be notified of the details of the situation so they are prepared for contamination and mass casualties. The FBI will assume the lead federal role to successfully resolve the criminal aspect of the incident, and will closely coordinate its efforts with appropriate local law enforcement agencies and other emergency authorities. In major incidents where consequence management has priority, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will take over the role of consequence management. However, federal agencies will not be on the scene for many hours; until that time it is local emergency response personnel who are in charge.

See Appendix C for a more complete list of response considerations.

Protective clothing
The Domestic Preparedness Chemical Team conducted Man in Simulant Testing (MIST) to determine the overall protection factor of protective suit ensembles to be used for protection against chemical agents. It was determined that standard fire fighter turnouts offer protection inadequate for prolonged periods of working in contaminated atmospheres. Head and groin areas were most susceptible to agent contamination.

To improve protection afforded by fire fighter turnouts, the Chemical Team offered the following "Quick Fix" suggestions:

Use duct tape to seal all openings:
Zippers, buttons, wrists, waist, ankles, neck
Use chemical protective undergarments
Use trash bags to cover body areas
Seal around all edges and openings; used over and/or under FFPE
Use NFPA-approved Chemical Protective suits:
Wear under duty uniform or over FFPE

Other recommendations:

Ventilate buildings with Positive Pressure Ventilation Fans before entry;
If the vapor hazard is high, limit activity in the hot zone to 1-1/5 minutes.
Taping procedures-The following instructions are offered for self-taping:
Pull pants leg up before taping to boot and put foot at an elevated position to allow free-play movement and prevent breaks in the tape seal;
Tape zipper at crotch;
Tape top of pants to shirt to form a solid waist seal;
Don coat; tape up along the front opening with two strips of duct tape;
Run duct tape around the waist to form a tape-belt that will hold the coat closer to the body, preventing billowing effect;
Put on SCBA with mask;
Put on helmet;
Put on gloves and tape the sleeves to the gloves.

Detection
To detect chemical agent use, first responders must be alert for signs, symptoms, and detection clues. The presentation of the victim will often be the best indication of the event and the agent or class of agent used.

Various devices for detection are available for many agents, including detection devices developed by the military. These include

Improved Chemical Agent Monitor-Detector (ICAM-D)
M18A2 Chemical Agent Detector Kit
US Army M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit
various enzyme tickets
M8 and M9 detection papers
detector tubes
pesticide tickets
electronic meters

For other agents, including choking agents and incapacitating agents, there are no effective means of detection except in the laboratory. The table in Appendix C lists appropriate detection devices for specific chemical agents.

Emergency responders must use the highest level of personal protection when conducting monitoring activities.

Response shortfalls and information gaps
The US government is spending billions of dollars through dozens of different agencies to implement effective US domestic policy on terrorism and to help emergency personnel. Public and private sector research labs are making technical advances in detection equipment and protective equipment. Pharmaceutical advances are being made to help victims of chemical agents. But at the local level, much needs to be done to prepare each community for the potential horror of a chemical attack.

The U.S. Army's Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) worked with over 20 local, state and federal agencies and organizations under the auspices of the Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program Exercises to identify shortfalls and information gaps in terrorism response. The following issues were identified:

Protocols and guidelines for dissemination of intelligence information among responders and emergency management organizations prior to the onset of an incident (threat intelligence information sharing)
National agencies must involve local personnel in every level of discussion about training, money, equipment and planning
Terrorist awareness training needed for all first responders
Training of dispatch personnel on clues that lead to early recognition of incidents of terrorism
Incident command training for command officers
Enhance existing hazmat teams rather than organize new specialized teams
Training for hazmat teams on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism
Communications systems must be fine tuned
Communication between incident scene and medical facilities
Working with the media to disseminate information while reducing their potential negative impact
Local responders need training to operate in environments that have been contaminated
Dealing with special needs community
Develop plans for prioritization and allocation of resources
Crowd control and management
Obtain rapid-detection equipment
Training in use of detection equipment
Obtain appropriate personal protective clothing and equipment for police and fire fighters
Training in use of protective clothing and equipment
Obtain decontamination equipment and organize and train special decon units
Develop procedures for handling mass casualties
Stockpile antidotes
Use of standardized incident command/unified command system
Evidence collection and management
How clean is clean? (when restoring community affected by persistent agent)
System for long-term monitoring of incident survivors.

The Dispatch is a publication of the Emergency Film Group. We welcome your questions and comments at info@efilmgroup.com